“That is a war that’s dying to be settled. I will get it settled before I even become president.”

- Donald Trump, during a September 2024 presidential debate

US President-elect Donald Trump has for two years loudly and boldly proclaimed that the Russia-Ukraine war needs to end, and that he is uniquely qualified to quickly bring that about. This episode explores the challenges Mr. Trump will face in his efforts to bring about a deal that is satisfactory enough for both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. By far the most important aspect in armistice negotiations between warring parties is the current military situation, the “realities on the ground” to use a commonly used phrase. That will be the focus on this episode. We will also look into potential options for the incoming US President might explore as he attempts to navigate a situation that even has recently indicated was more difficult than the Middle East. Either way, we will soon learn just how influential Mr. Trump’s reputation as a strong-minded figure who is nevertheless willing to broker deals will be on a Russia-Ukraine War that is nearing its third year.

“When America had defeated Japan by detonating an atomic bomb, the Führer had sent a V-3 rocket to explode in the skies of New York to prove he could retaliate in kind if struck. After that, the war had dwindled to ... a nuclear stalemate the diplomats called the cold war.”

- Robert Harris, from the novel Fatherland.

In this episode we continue to look at one of the most common “What If?” questions in history: the plausibility of the Axis powers (specifically Germany) winning the Second World War. Also, probably the most complicated. In the first part, we looked at historical patterns and the major factors that greatly favored the Allies. Nevertheless, Germany seemed to be in a good position by the Autumn of 1940, even if it was defeated in the Battle of Britain. The British Empire's position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East seemed vulnerable, the Soviet Union was still collaborating with Nazi Germany, and the United States was still neutral. We pick up the story here and explore possible alternative paths history might have taken. We try to stay true to the historical circumstances and key factors that weighed on leaders and decision makers that made the events of WWII unfold as it did. While the obstacles of an Axis powers seem daunting, maybe there was an alternative path Germany and Japan could have taken for a different outcome.

“This is how history went after McCoy changed it … Because ALL this lets them develop the A-bomb first. With the A-bomb & with their V2 rockets to carry them, Germany captured the world.”

- Spock, from the Star Trek Episode, “The City on the Edge of Forever.”

In this episode we look at one of the most common “What If?” questions in history: the plausibility of the Axis powers (specifically Germany) winning the Second World War. Also, probably the most complicated. Could Germany have been better off waiting to start the war? What if Hitler’s strategic errors are removed from the equation? Was the Allied victory inevitable? While these and other questions at first glance to make such counterfactual assessments a rabbit hole way too deep, when the nature of the Second World War is examined closely and longstanding historical patterns in warfare are kept in mind, the reasoning for the Allied victory becomes clear and, consequently, potential paths the Axis powers could have taken for a different outcome are few.

“I had a feeling of the essential rightness of all. He was dead and I was alive; it could so easily have been the other way round; and that would somehow have been right too.”

- Richard Hillary, Royal Air Force pilot, reflecting on the first German plane he shot down

In this episode we look at the controversial claim made by US Army General S.L.A. Marshall in 1947, when he asserted that less than 25% of US riflemen fired their weapons at the enemy in WWII. What is usually called the ratio-of-fire statistic, Marshall’s thesis almost immediately influenced the US Army did undergo training reforms to ensure more of its troops fire their weapons, which have succeeded such by the Vietnam War, over 90% of troops were firing at the enemy. The ratio-of-fire statistic had proven to be influential outside military circles, having inspired numerous social scientists to accept the notion that soldiers have an innate reluctance to kill, despite whatever training or propaganda they are exposed to. Here we dig deeper to investigate the evidence for Marshall’s claim and explore why it has proven to endure despite the controversy and criticism surrounding it.

"AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL."
– US Navy dispatch, December 7, 1941.

In this episode we look at one of the all-too frequent examples of a successful surprise attack in modern warfare. Most students of history are familiar with the basics: an (un)fortunate set of circumstances enabled Japanese carrier air forces to achieve complete surprise and inflict heavy damage to US military forces at the Hawaiian naval base. Here we dig a little deeper to investigate why the Japanese decided to go to war with the United States and ultimately why the attack failed to achieve the strategic goal set out by its planners. Seen mostly from the Japanese perspective, it is a tale of how pressures on policymakers and commanders often push them into making decisions against their better judgement and issuing vague military orders that result in sloppy execution.

"Moltke is not a general to copy but to study"
- J.F.C. Fuller

In this episode we look at Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), the Prussian Chief of the Prussian General Staff most noted for the dramatic Prussian victories over Austria and France which led to the foundation of Germany in 1871. Most historians will casually acknowledge him as a brilliant military figure and attribute the dramatic rise of Prussia military prowess to his leadership. Not wrong, but not quite right. Moltke was not a battlefield commander and did not even issue direct orders at the battles the history books credit him for winning. So, we are talking about a system here, an operation which could win battles and change the course of military history without the need for or the personal intervention of a genius. Moltke was representative of a breakthrough in military thinking, organization, and efficiency carried out by what was an obscure group of professionals dedicated to such matters known as the Prussian General Staff. That every modern major military has a General Staff is a testament to Moltke’s historical importance.

“The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”
– Henry Kissinger

In this episode we update a classic article written by Andrew Mack back in 1975. As I feel strongly enough that a 50-year-old article is worth re-investigating and much of this analysis is based on Mack’s original conclusions, I highly recommend you read the original which is easily available in digital format. Its full title is “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” and it appeared in the journal World Politics, Volume 27.

How do massively outnumbered, outgunned, out-trained, and out-supplied guerillas sustain themselves in the field indefinitely? What explains the paradox that even though the big nations win the key battles, such as the US with the Tet Offensive and the French in Algiers, they nevertheless find themselves in a weaker strategic position? Would the outcomes have been different if the civilian leaderships did not tie the hands of their militaries? These are rabbit holes that have some unsettling implications.